Okay, veering away from the value thinger for a moment, I'm frustrated with the author of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. I'm not done reading it yet, but the author is arguing quite strongly that not all things can be defined, and they can only be grasped through some mystic immediate knowledge. I wholly disagree.
Truth is useful because it represents a glimpse of reality. Truths are tiny pinhole windows of understanding along a long wall in a dark room. The hope is that we will eventually poke enough holes in the wall to see clearly. Some disagree with this, and I'll get to Gödel and Quine in an upcoming post (I tend to have a few rough drafts on the go at a time.) I disagree as well, in the sense that we as human being could ever know everything. There are limits to our perceptions, and there is an enormous amount of information being generated every moment. Something that Pirsig points out (well, Poincaré points it out) is that there are an infinite number of hypotheses that correlate to empirical evidence. So any idea that create from a posteriori knowledge contains the possibility to being only interpretive and equally valid to another interpretation.
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Portrait of a skeptic |
Pirsig goes on to try to justify the mystic mode of "knowledge" by getting people to try to define "quality" and showing that they can't do it in a simple sentence even though we all know what we are talking about. I think the problem is with his definition of definitions. It's really nice to have something spelled out on paper, in black and white, but as an artist myself I can tell you that the syntax of that language is limited (as are all languages.) Perhaps oral/written languages are as ill-equipped to handle "quality" as music is to handle shopping lists. Behind each idea, each interpretation of bit of the world as you see it is a tiny collapsed point of an idea. Let's call this the virtual idea. To clarify, I'm not talking about Pure Idea, just the bit of a particular idea that you then express.
Wittgenstein has this great solution in his book Philosophical Investigations. He says that we learn words through "language games," such that given enough examples of something we can eventually refine our understanding of the word (as a symbol) of the virtual idea. I think Pirsig should have considered this possibility. It makes things much more difficult to write down, but can be the only way to express something (especially as language only works for shared experience.) Perhaps we need to extend our definition of valid definitions to include things known (ie: virtual ideas) that are shared understanding, but cannot be expressed in a given language.
I must admit then that formal logic may be missing something as it is bound by its syntax. Granted I would suspect then that anything proven with rigour via self-evident statements should be true, but that you can only find a subset of all truths deducible from self-evident statements.
Outline:
- Ideas exist as hypotheses to help us understand reality
- They may be refined
- An infinite number of hypothesis exist that can explain any phenomena as long as they are deficient even in the slightest way
- Words are symbols (placeholders) for ideas
- We use them to communicate
- We can only communicate shared experience
- Language-games define things by showing
- Language games do not rely on strict syntax
- There are some things that traditional definitions cannot express
- We need to extend our concept of "definition" to include things that do not express well in the common language
- All languages are only able to express a subset of all things that you would like to express
- Music cannot tell you to buy milk, but verbal language can't express some ideas that music can
- Formal logic is a type of language, and thus can only express a subset of truths
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